Auditions des candidats aux allocations
post-doctorales Ile-de-France-EEP
Jeudi 13 septembre 2007, MSE, Paris 1
Salle du 6ième étage
15h-16h : Vincent Iehlé
Group economies and games (with Myrna Wooders).
Abstract.
We propose to model group formation (political parties, clubs) in an economy
in which agents have a preference relation over bundles of groups. We model
the economy as a non-cooperative game where each individual's strategy set
is a list of those groups containing himself that (s)he would like to form.
An individual can participate to the group proposals of the other agents,
to which he belongs to. The equilibrium realization of groups will depend
however on the resulting outcome of the group proposals. Concepts of stability
and equilibrium with individualized group prices are defined in accordance.The
main features include: a new model to deal with group formation; equivalence
results between the core and competitive equilibrium allocations and strong
Nash equilibria.
16h-17h : Karlygash Kuralbayeva