Abstract:

The paper examines under what conditions vertically differentiated duopolists engage in first-degree price discrimination. Each firm decides on a pricing regime at a first stage, and sets prices at a second stage. The paper shows that when unit cost is an increasing and convex function of quality, the discriminatory regime is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of such two-stage game. In contrast to the case of horizontal differentiation, the discriminatory equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto-dominated by a bilateral commitment to uniform pricing. Also, the quality choices of perfectly discriminating duopolists are welfare maximizing. The paper also explains why a threat of entry may elicit price discrimination by an incumbent monopolist.


1 Introduction

Until recently, economists viewed first-degree discrimination as a theoretical construct without real world applications. The primary reason was that sellers did not possess information about the reservation prices of individual buyers. Unsurprisingly, the literature on first-degree-discrimination remained scarce. A notable exception arose in spatial economics. Because distance could be observed, and correlated with transportation cost, the spatial economics literature often assumed that the mill price a seller could charge a buyer increased with the distance that separated him from that buyer (Hurter and Lederer, 1985, Lederer and Hurter, 1986, Thisse and Vives, 1988, Hamilton and Thisse, 1992, Ulph and Vulkan, 2000, 2001, Bhaskar and To, 2004).

Perceptions about the practicality of first-degree-discrimination have changed. The change has coincided with advances in information gathering/processing techniques, and the proliferation of computer-mediated transactions. (Shapiro and Varian, 1999, Varian, 2003). It has spawned a literature that explores how on-line sellers exploit information about consumer preferences to personalize prices and product specifications (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000, Acquisti and Varian, 2001, Varian, 2003).

The improved capacity to gather and process information has also influenced pricing in traditional trading environments. Personalized discounting has become common at the check-out counter where sellers tailor promotional offers to current purchases. Financial institutions also engage in personalization when they customize offers to clients’ net worth and payment history. Similarly, journal publishers adapt on-line subscription fees to the characteristics of individual academic libraries.

A particular form of personalized pricing takes place in aftermarkets where firms earn high margins from the sale of parts whose wear and tear increases with intensity of use. And, in markets for intellectual property, personalized pricing did not await the emergence of on-line technologies. Royalties have traditionally depended on intensity of use.

Clearly, sellers’ capacity to engage in personalized pricing also depends on their ability to restrict reselling by first buyers. To limit reselling, some software firms do not transfer ownership of their products; they grant consumers a non-transferable right to use their products. Personalization of prices also requires that sellers’ costs not increase too fast as the number of price categories expands. Because on-line technologies facilitate customization in the absence of face-to-face interactions, personalized pricing is more common in on-line environments.

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1 The terms “personalized pricing” and “first-degree price discrimination” are used interchangeably. First-degree price discrimination as used by Pigou (1920) refers to pricing that takes place when full information about consumers’ demand is available and allows sellers to tailor prices to individual consumers. It does not necessarily describe a situation where all consumer surplus is captured by the producer(s) (See Stole, 2003).

2 Some of the techniques used in online retailing are described at http://www.accenture.com/Global/Services/

Accenture Technology Labs/R_and_I/PersonalizedPricingTool.htm

3 See Edlin and Rubinfeld (2004)

4 See e.g. Emch (2003)
face contact, they are equally valuable in this regard.

Although first-degree price discrimination remains a limiting case, on-line technologies allow a form of pricing which, in some markets, approaches first-degree price discrimination.

This paper examines personalized pricing in a market served by a quality-differentiated duopoly. It addresses four questions. (1) What are the properties of the non-cooperative equilibrium in which each duopolist sets a perfectly discriminating price schedule? (2) Under what conditions would firms prefer to engage in personalized pricing even if had the means to enforce an agreement to price uniformly? (3) Does first-degree price discrimination perform better in terms of consumer and total welfare than uniform pricing? (4) How do the quality choices of perfectly discriminating duopolists measure up in terms of welfare?

The paper addresses these questions in a framework similar to Thisse and Vives (1988). It finds that a transition from uniform to discriminatory pricing affects profits via two channels: An enhanced capacity to extract surplus from some buyers, and an intensification of competition for the patronage of other buyers. However, the results differ from Thisse and Vives (1988) in regard to the existence of a prisoner’s dilemma. Thisse and Vives (1988) found that when differentiation is horizontal, both duopolists are better off by enforcing an agreement to price uniformly. This paper finds that when differentiation is vertical, the Nash equilibrium in discriminatory price schedules need not be Pareto dominated by such agreement. Specifically, it shows that a prisoner’s dilemma arises if and only if the ratio of market areas served by the two firms lies within an interval whose bounds can be calculated using generally observable data.

While the paper is formally close to Choudhary et al. (2005), it is different in spirit and addresses a wider set of issues. Choudhary et al. (2005) focus on the comparison of prices and qualities under alternative exogenously given pricing regimes. This paper by contrast, determines a pricing regime as an equilibrium strategy. It also assumes a more general distribution of consumer preferences, and a more general cost function.

Section 2 introduces the model and section 3 characterizes the equilibrium that emerges from the simultaneous choice of discriminatory price schedules by the duopolists. It establishes that personalized prices are not monotonic in consumers’ willingness to pay. It shows why competition in discriminatory price schedules yields a welfare maximizing market coverage, and a welfare maximizing partition of the market into buyers of high and low quality. Section 4 addresses the question whether discrimination by the duopolists is an equilibrium strategy when the pricing regime is endogenous. Section 5 shows that in contrast to the case of horizontal differentiation, prior commitments by both firms to set uniform prices do not necessarily enhance profits. Section 6 en-

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5 Ulph and Vulkan (2000) develop a similar model. They find that a switch from uniform pricing to discriminatory pricing boosts profits when transport cost increases rapidly with distance.

6 The differences are examined in greater detail in the body of paper.
dogenizes the choice of qualities and establishes that duopolists who engage in discriminatory pricing set qualities that maximize welfare. Section 7 provides concluding remarks and examines implications for competition policy.

2 The model

Consider a market in which two firms serve a continuum of consumers. The size of the market is normalized to one. Each firm produces a single variety of a vertically differentiated product. For convenience the varieties are called ”high quality” and ”low quality ” and denoted $s_H$ and $s_L$, where $s_H > s_L > 0$. The producers of these qualities are called the high ($H$) and the low ($L$) quality firms.

Consumers have preferences à la Mussa-Rosen (1978). Each consumer is identified by a taste parameter $\theta \in [0, b]$ distributed with positive and continuous density $f(\theta)$ over the interval $[0, b]$. A consumer buys a single unit of high or low quality, or nothing at all. Consumer $\theta$’s reservation price for a single unit of quality $s_i$ is $\theta s_i$ ($i \in \{H, L\}$). Consumer $\theta$ gets a surplus $\theta s_i - p_i(\theta)$ from a unit of quality $s_i$ purchased at the price $p_i(\theta)$, and a zero surplus from no purchase. Consumers cannot resell to other consumers.

The cost of producing $q_i$ units of quality $s_i$ is $C(s_i, q_i) = c(s_i)q_i$ where $c(s_i)$ denotes the unit cost of quality $s_i$. The function $c(.)$ is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly convex. Specifically :

$$c(0) = 0, \ c'(s) > 0, \ c''(s) > 0, \forall s > 0 \ (1)$$

The latter implies:

$$0 < \frac{c(s_L)}{s_L} < \frac{c(s_H)}{s_H} < \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L}, \forall s_H > s_L > 0 \ (2)$$

Because the paper focuses on producers’ choices among pricing regimes, it assumes that both firms are active under all regimes considered in the paper. This condition is met when (3) below is satisfied

$$b > \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L}, \forall s_H > s_L > 0 \ (3)$$

Throughout the paper, the term price schedule refers to a positive valued function $p_i(.)$ defined on $[0, b]$ that specifies the price $p_i(\theta)$ at which firm $i$ is willing to sell one unit to consumer $\theta$. A price schedule is uniform when a single price targets all consumers. It is perfectly discriminating or personalized, when the component prices vary according to the taste parameter of each individual consumers that they target.

The paper examines four pricing regimes. Under the uniform regime, denoted $(U_H, U_L)$, both firms set uniform price schedules. Under the discriminatory regime, denoted $(D_H, D_L)$, both firms set discriminatory price schedules. The remaining regimes, denoted $(U_H, D_L)$ and $(D_H, U_L)$, are asymmetric. One firm sets a uniform price acting as a Stackelberg leader, while the other firm sets a perfectly discriminating schedule.
3 Regime \((D_H, D_L)\)

For any pair of price schedules \((p_H(\cdot), p_L(\cdot))\), the market areas served by firms \(H\) and \(L\) are:

\[
\Theta_H(p_H(\cdot), p_L(\cdot)) = \{ \theta \in [0, b] | \theta s_L - p_H(\theta) \geq \text{Max}[0, \theta s_L - p_L(\theta)] \} \quad (4)
\]

\[
\Theta_L(p_H(\cdot), p_L(\cdot)) = \{ \theta \in [0, b] | \theta s_L - p_L(\theta) \geq \text{Max}[0, \theta s_L - p_H(\theta)] \} \quad (5)
\]

Therefore, firm \(i\)'s profits \((i \in \{H, L\})\) are:

\[
\Pi_i(p_H(\cdot), p_L(\cdot)) = \int_{\Theta_i(p_H(\cdot), p_L(\cdot))} [p_i(\theta) - c(s_i)] f(\theta) d\theta \quad (6)
\]

Firm \(i\) is said to have a monopoly position with respect to consumer \(\theta\) if for any price schedule chosen by the rival firm \(j\), it can attract that consumer with a price \(\theta s_i\) that captures the entire surplus. Firm \(i\) is said to have a cost-quality advantage over it’s rival \(j\) with respect to consumer \(\theta\) if there exists a price \(p_i(\theta)\) at which it can attract consumer \(\theta\) when the rival \(j\) targets consumer \(\theta\) with a price equal to its unit cost \(c(s_j)\). Clearly, a firm that holds a monopoly position with respect to a consumer also holds a cost-quality advantage over its rival with respect to the same consumer. The converse is not true.

Proposition 1 characterizes the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game in which both firms independently choose the discriminatory regime.

**Proposition 1** The Nash equilibrium of the game in discriminatory price schedules with payoffs given by (6) is the pair \((p^*_H(\theta), p^*_L(\theta))\) defined by (7) and (8) below where \(p_H(\theta)\) and \(p_L(\theta)\) are any price schedules above unit costs.

\[
p^*_H(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
  c(s_L) + \theta(s_H - s_L) & \text{if} \quad \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} \leq \theta \leq b \\
  c(s_H) & \text{if} \quad \frac{c(s_H)}{s_H} \leq \theta < \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} \\
  p_H(\theta) \geq c(s_H) & \text{if} \quad 0 \leq \theta < \frac{c(s_H)}{s_H}
\end{cases} \quad (7)
\]

\[
p^*_L(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
  c(s_L) & \text{if} \quad \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} \leq \theta \leq b \\
  c(s_H) - \theta(s_H - s_L) & \text{if} \quad \frac{c(s_H)}{s_H} \leq \theta < \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} \\
  \theta s_L & \text{if} \quad \frac{c(s_L)}{s_L} \leq \theta < \frac{c(s_H)}{s_H} \\
  p_L(\theta) \geq c(s_L) & \text{if} \quad 0 \leq \theta < \frac{c(s_L)}{s_L}
\end{cases} \quad (8)
\]

**Proof:**
Under perfect discrimination each consumer pays a price determined solely by that consumer’s preference for quality. This follows immediately from the
assumptions that reselling among consumers is impossible, and that unit cost is independent of quantity. No firm sells below unit cost to any consumer because doing so does not allow it to earn a larger profit from another consumer. Therefore, competition in discriminatory price schedules adds up to a collection of Bertrand games for individual consumers.

One can now examine the equilibrium in four market segments, using the simplified notation $c_H$ for $c(s_H)$ and $c_L$ for $c(s_L)$.

1. $\theta \in \left[ \frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L}, b \right]$

When $p^*_L(\theta) = c_L$ consumers derive positive surplus from purchasing low quality. The highest price $p_H(\theta)$ at which they would purchase high quality satisfies the condition $\theta s_H - p_H(\theta) = \theta s_L - c_L$ which implies (7). When the $H$-firm sets $p^*_H(\theta) = c_L + \theta(s_H - s_L)$, consumers obtain a surplus $\theta s_L - c_L$ from high quality. They would purchase low quality only if it were priced below unit cost, which is non profitable. Therefore, $p^*_L(\theta) = c_L$ is an optimal response by firm $L$ to the schedule $p^*_H(\theta)$. Firm $H$ enjoys a cost-quality advantage over firm $L$, but no monopoly position, with respect to all consumers in the interval.

2. $\theta \in \left[ \frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L}, \frac{c_H}{s_H} \right]$

For $p^*_L(\theta) = c_H - \theta(s_H - s_L)$ consumers in the interval obtain a surplus $\theta s_L - c_H$ from low quality. Firm $H$ can attract these consumers only by pricing below unit cost. Because this yields a negative profit without producing a compensatory increase in profits from consumers in other intervals, a best response of firm $H$ is to set the price $c_H$. And, when $p^*_H(\theta) = c_H$, the highest price at which firm $L$ can attract consumers satisfies the condition $\theta s_L - p^*_L(\theta) = \theta s_H - c_H$ which implies (7). Clearly, firm $L$ has a cost-quality advantage but no monopoly position with respect to consumers in this interval.

3. $\theta \in \left[ \frac{c_L}{s_L}, \frac{c_H}{s_H} \right]$

All price schedules above unit cost are optimal for firm $H$ because firm $L$ holds a monopoly position in the interval. The best response of firm $L$ is to set $p^*_L(\theta) = \theta s_L$ which allows its capture of the entire consumer surplus.

4. $\theta \in \left[ 0, \frac{c_H}{s_H} \right]$

Within this interval no firm can attract a consumer by pricing at unit cost or higher. This is true for any price schedule chosen by the rival producer. All pairs of schedules with no component below unit cost ensure zero sales and are therefore equilibria. QED

Substitution of (7) and (8) into (6) yields the equilibrium profits:

$$\Pi_H(D_H, D_L) = \int_{\frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H}}^{b} [c_L + \theta(s_H - s_L) - c_H] f(\theta) d\theta \quad (9)$$

$$\Pi_L(D_H, D_L) = \int_{\frac{c_L-c_H}{s_L}}^{\frac{c_H}{s_H}} [\theta s_L - c_L] f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H}}^{\frac{c_H}{s_H}} [c_H - \theta(s_H - s_L) - c_L] f(\theta) d\theta \quad (10)$$

Figure 1 displays the equilibrium.\footnote{In the space $(\theta, p)$, the coordinates of points $T$, $L$, $V$, $K$, $M$ and $I$ are $\theta_T = \frac{c_H}{s_H}$, $p_T = $}
the participation constraints for high and low quality buyers. The line segment $KM$ is the self-selection constraint faced by the high quality firm when its rival sells at unit cost. Similarly, the line segment $TL$ represents the self-selection constraint faced by the low quality firm when its rival offers high quality at unit cost. The high quality firm serves the market segment $[c_H \cdot s_H, c_L \cdot s_H]$, sets the price schedule represented by $KM$. The low quality firm divides the consumers it serves into two segments. With respect to consumers with $\theta \in [\frac{c_L}{s_H}, \frac{c_H}{s_H}]$, it sets prices at which the participation constraint is binding ($VT$ in Figure 1). With respect to consumers with $\theta \in [\frac{c_L}{s_H}, \frac{c_H}{s_H}]$, it sets prices at which the consumers’ self-selection constraint binds ($TL$ in Figure 1). Note that the price paid by these consumers decreases when their reservation price increases. This result is akin to the absorption effect in the Thisse and Vives (1988) model.

![Figure 1: Regime (D_H, D_L)](image)

The profit earned by the high quality firm from an individual consumer is represented by the vertical distance between the line segment $KM$ and the horizontal line $c_H$. Because the total profit is a weighted sum of these distances on the segment $[\frac{c_H}{s_H}, c_L \cdot s_H]$, we say that $\Pi_H(D_H, D_L)$ is $area(KMI)$, keeping in mind that the area is properly defined by the integral (9). Similarly, $\Pi_L(D_H, D_L)$ is $area(VTL)$.

$c_H \cdot s_H$, $\theta_L = \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L}$, $p_L = c_L$, $\theta_V = \frac{c_L}{s_L}$, $p_V = c_L$, $\theta_K = \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L}$, $p_K = c_H$, $\theta_M = b$, $p_M = c_L + b(s_H - s_L)$ and $\theta_I = b$, $p_I = c_H$. 

7
Proposition 1 entails the following:

**Corollary 2** Personalized prices competition by quality differentiated duopolists (regime \((D_H, D_L)\)) yields a market coverage and a segmentation of consumers into high and low quality buyers that maximize total welfare.

**Proof:**

Each unit sold to yields a positive total surplus larger than the total surplus that would be have been generated from a sale to the same consumer of a unit of the other quality. This follows from the fact that a consumer who purchases low quality must gain less in utility from switching to high quality than would be added in to the cost production. Similarly, a consumer of high quality would lose more in utility from switching to low quality than the saving in production cost. QED

4 Selecting a price policy.

One can now address the question whether price discrimination is an equilibrium of a game in which firms can commit to price uniformly. Consider a three-stage game. In the first stage, each firm chooses whether to commit to a uniform schedule. If the two firms commit, they sell at the second stage at the prices they committed to. This is the regime \((U_H, U_L)\). If no firm commits in the first period, each remains free to set any price schedule in the second stage. This is the regime \((D_H, D_L)\). If one of the duopolists commits at the first stage, it acts as a Stackelberg leader at the second stage, while the other acts as a follower. These asymmetric regimes are denoted \((U_H, D_L)\) and \((D_H, U_L)\).\(^8\) In all regimes, consumers make their purchasing decisions at the last stage.

Committing to a uniform price can only be rational if it elicits a pricing response on the part of the rival that is favorable to the firm that makes the commitment. The credibility of such commitment may derive from sunk investments in a distribution channel that puts intermediaries between manufacturers and consumers and does not allow the former to ascertain individual consumer preferences. It can arise from a most-favored-customer clause granted by the seller. It may also rest on a threat of reputational losses that would ensue from backing down on the pre-announced uniform price. It is assumed that the firms committing to a uniform price take measures that lend credibility to their commitment. However these measures are not modeled.

### 4.1 Regime \((U_H, D_L)\)

Suppose that the \(H\)-firm sets a uniform price \(p_H > c_H\). The best response of the \(L\)-firm when is:

\(^8\)We show in appendix 1 that there does not exist a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies within the framework of a static game where the high quality firm chooses a uniform price and the low quality firm chooses a perfectly discriminating price schedule. Thisse and Vives (1988) find the same for horizontal differentiation.
\[ p_L(\theta, p_H) = \begin{cases} 
    c_L & \text{if } \frac{p_H - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} \leq \theta \leq b \\
    p_H - \theta(s_H - s_L) & \text{if } \frac{p_H}{s_H} \leq \theta < \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} \\
    \theta s_L & \text{if } \frac{c(s_H)}{s_L} \leq \theta < \frac{p_H}{s_H} \\
    p_L(\theta) & \text{if } 0 \leq \theta < \frac{c(s_L)}{s_L} 
\end{cases} \] (11)

The profits are

\[ \Pi_L(p_H, p_L(\cdot)) = \int_{s_L}^{s_H} [s_L - c_L] f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{s_H}^{p_H - c_L} [p_H - \theta(s_H - s_L) - c_L] f(\theta) d\theta \] (12)

\[ \Pi_H(p_H, p_L(\cdot, p_H)) = \int_{s_H - s_L}^{p_H - c_H} [p_H - c_H] f(\theta) d\theta \] (13)

Because \( \Pi_H \) is a continuous function of \( p_H \), there exists a \( p_H^* \) that maximizes \( \Pi_H \) over the compact set \([c_H, b s_H] \). The Stackelberg equilibrium of the game where the \( H \) and \( L \)-firms act respectively as a leader and a follower is the pair \((p_H^*, p_L(\theta, p_H^*))\) where \( p_L(\theta, p_H) \) is given by (11).

Figure 2 displays the profits \( \Pi_L(p_H, p_L(\cdot)) \) as \( area(VAB) \) and \( \Pi_H(p_H, p_L(\cdot, p_H)) \) as \( area(FGIN) \). Because \( \frac{c_H}{s_L} < \frac{c_H}{s_H} < \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} < \frac{p_H - c_H}{s_H - s_L} \), it must be true that \( VTL \subset VAB \) or \( \Pi_L(D_H, D_L) < \Pi_L(p_H, p_L(\cdot)) \). For the same reason, \( FGIN \subset KMI \) or \( \Pi_H(p_H, p_L(\cdot, p_H)) < \Pi_H(D_H, D_L) \). One can therefore conclude that a high quality firm that commits to the uniform price \( p_H^* > c_H \) while its rival does not commit, earns less than it would earn if no one committed. This is true despite the fact that commitment bestows upon the high quality firm a role of Stackelberg leader.
Upon defining \( p_H^* = \arg \max_{p_H \in [c_H, b]} \Pi_H(p_H, p_L(., p_H)) \), one can write \( \Pi_H(U_H, D_L) = \Pi_H(p_H^*, p_L(., p_H^*)) \) and \( \Pi_L(U_H, D_L) = \Pi_L(p_H^*, p_L(., p_H)) \) with \( p_L(\theta, p_H^*) \) given by (11). Because \( \Pi_H(p_H, p_L(., p_H)) < \Pi_H(D_H, D_L) \) holds true for any \( p_H > c_H \), it holds true for \( p_H^* \) as well. Therefore:

\[
\Pi_H(U_H, D_L) < \Pi_H(D_H, D_L) \quad (14)
\]

and

\[
\Pi_L(U_H, D_L) > \Pi_L(D_H, D_L) \quad (15)
\]

Figure 2 clarifies the differences between the \((U_H, D_L)\) and \((D_H, D_L)\) regimes: i) Commitment by firm \( H \) to a uniform price \( p_H > c_H \) shifts the self-selection constraint faced by the low quality firm upward (from \( TL \) to \( AB \)) and shortens the self-selection constraint faced by the high quality firm (from \( KM \) to \( FM \)); ii) the market coverage is the same under the two regimes although the market area served by the high quality firm is smaller under \((U_H, D_L)\) regime than under the \((D_H, D_L)\) regime, and the market served by the low quality firm is larger\(^9\); iii) the market area of the low quality buyers who retain no surplus is larger under \((U_H, D_L)\) regime than under the \((D_H, D_L)\) regime.

### 4.2 Regime \((D_H, U_L)\)

Assume that the \( L \)-firm sets a uniform price \( p_L > c_L \). Clearly \( p_L \geq c_H \) cannot be sustained as an equilibrium because the \( H \)-firm could undercut the \( L \)-firm, capture the market served by the \( L \)-firm, and increase its profit by doing so. When the low quality firm commits to a uniform price \( p_L \in (c_L, c_H) \) the best response of the high quality producer depends on whether \( \theta \) is larger or smaller than \( \frac{c_H - p_L}{s_H - s_L} \). For \( \theta < \frac{c_H - p_L}{s_H - s_L} \), any schedule \( p_H(\theta) \geq c_H \) yields zero sales and is therefore a best response. Thus, the best response of firm \( H \) to \( p_L \in (c_L, c_H) \) is:

\[
p_H(\theta, p_L) = \begin{cases} 
p_L + \theta(s_H - s_L) & \text{for} \quad \theta \geq \frac{c_H - p_L}{s_H - s_L} \\
p_H(\theta) & \text{for} \quad \theta < \frac{c_H - p_L}{s_H - s_L}
\end{cases} \quad (16)
\]

Profits are:

\[
\Pi_H(p_H(., p_L), p_L) = \int_{\frac{c_H - p_L}{s_H - s_L}}^{b} [p_L + \theta(s_H - s_L) - c_H] f(\theta) d\theta \quad (17)
\]

\[
\Pi_L(p_H(., p_L), p_L) = \int_{\frac{p_L}{s_L}}^{c_H - p_L} (p_L - c_L) f(\theta) d\theta \quad (18)
\]

\(^9\)This comes about because the firm that commits has no interest in competing aggressively for consumers who are more or less indifferent between the two qualities when each is priced at unit cost. The reason it does not is that it would have to accept a lower margin on sales to consumers with a strong preference for its quality.
Note that the condition $\frac{p_H}{s_L} < \frac{p_L - c_H}{c_H - s_L}$ which ensures positive sales for the $L$-firm [see (18)] is equivalent to $\frac{p_H}{s_L} > \frac{c_H}{c_H - s_L}$. Using the same arguments as for regime $(D_L, U_H)$ one can show $\Pi_H(p_H(\cdot, p_L), p_L) > \Pi_H(D_H, D_L)$ and $\Pi_L(p_H(\cdot, p_L), p_L) < \Pi_L(D_H, D_L)$ which imply

$$\Pi_L(D_H, U_L) < \Pi_L(D_H, D_L) (19)$$

and

$$\Pi_H(D_H, U_L) > \Pi_H(D_H, D_L) (20)$$

One observes the following differences between the $(D_H, U_L)$ and the $(D_H, D_L)$ regimes: 1) Total market coverage is smaller under the $(D_H, U_L)$ regime; ii) the segment served by the low quality firm is smaller under the $(D_H, U_L)$ regime whereas the segment served by the high quality producer is larger.

### 4.3 Regime $(U_H, U_L)$

This is the standard regime examined in the literature. The concavity of $f(\theta)$ over $[0, b]$ is a sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium for an arbitrary distribution of consumer preferences. It is assumed that this condition is met.

Existence of a Nash equilibrium in uniform prices together with (14) and (19) imply the following proposition:

**Proposition 3** For any concave density function $f(\theta)$, personalization of prices is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the three-stage game where: i) vertically differentiated duopolists determine whether or not to commit to a specific uniform price in a first stage; ii) in the second stage a firm that committed acts as a Stackelberg leader stage vis-a-vis a firm that did not commit, and if no one committed, both simultaneously set their price schedules; iii) in the third stage consumers make their purchases.

For a general density function one cannot compare the profits under this equilibrium with the profits generated under a mutual commitment to price uniformly. To compare profits under the two pricing regimes, the next section assumes a specific density function.

### 5 A prisoner’s dilemma?

The finding that price personalization constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium is the counterpart for quality differentiation of the Thisse and Vives (1998) result for horizontal differentiation. Thisse and Vives (1998) also established that spatially differentiated duopolists would be better off if they enforced an agreement to set uniform prices. This section shows for the particular case of a

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10 See Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed (2005)
uniform distribution of consumer preferences - also studied by Thissie and Vives - that discrimination need not be Pareto dominated by uniform pricing when differentiation is vertical.

Table 1 now shows that for a uniform four pricing regimes for uniform distribution of consumer preferences - also studied by Thisse and Vives - that discrimination need not be Pareto dominated by uniform pricing when differentiation is vertical.

Table 1 displays the profits of the high and low quality firms for each of the four pricing regimes for uniform $f(.)$.\(^{11}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$D_H$</th>
<th>$U_H$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Pi_H = \frac{4s_H - s_L}{2s_B} \left[ b - \left( \frac{c_h - c_l}{s_H - s_L} \right) \right]^2$</td>
<td>$\Pi_H = \frac{4s_H^2 (s_H - s_L)}{(4s_H - s_L)^2} \left[ b - \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{c_h - c_l}{s_H - s_L} \right) \right]^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Pi_L = \frac{4s_H}{2s_B} \left[ \frac{c_h - c_l}{s_H - s_L} - \frac{c_L}{s_L} \right] \frac{2}{3} \left( \frac{c_h - c_l}{s_H - s_L} \right)$</td>
<td>$\Pi_L = \frac{4s_H}{2s_B} \left[ \frac{c_h - c_l}{s_H - s_L} - \frac{c_L}{s_L} \right] \frac{1}{3} \left( \frac{c_h - c_l}{s_H - s_L} \right)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Profits under four pricing regimes with uniform density

One shows first that the Nash equilibrium ($D_H, D_L$) is an equilibrium in dominant strategies. It has already been established that $\Pi_H(D_H, D_L) > \Pi_H(U_H, D_L)$ and $\Pi_L(D_H, D_L) > \Pi_L(U_H, U_L)$ for any distribution $f(.)$. Table 1 now shows that for a uniform $f(\theta)$, $\Pi_H(D_H, D_L) = 2\Pi_H(U_H, D_L)$ and $\Pi_L(D_H, D_L) = 2\Pi_L(U_H, U_L)$.\(^{12}\) Moreover, one easily checks that $0 < s_L < s_H$ entails $\frac{1}{3} < \frac{4s_H^2}{(4s_H - s_L)^2} < \frac{4}{9}$ implying $\Pi_H(D_H, U_L) > \Pi_H(U_H, U_L)$ and $\Pi_L(U_H, D_L) > \Pi_L(U_H, U_L)$. Therefore, $D_H$ and $D_L$ are dominant strategies for players $H$ and $L$.

Define now $\alpha \equiv s_L/s_H$, and $\lambda \equiv (b - \frac{c_h - c_l}{s_H - s_L})/(\frac{c_h - c_l}{s_H - s_L} - \frac{c_L}{s_L})$, i.e. $\lambda$ represents the ratio of market segments served by the two firms under the regime ($D_H, D_L$). Consider the following intermediate result:

**Lemma:** There exist two functions $F_H(\alpha) \equiv \frac{\sqrt{\alpha}}{4 - 2\sqrt{\alpha} - \alpha}$ and $F_L(\alpha) \equiv \frac{4 - 2\sqrt{\alpha} - \alpha}{\sqrt{\alpha}^2}$ such that $\Pi_H(D_H, D_L) > \Pi_H(U_H, U_L)$ if and only if $\lambda > F_H(\alpha)$ and $\Pi_L(D_H, D_L) > \Pi_L(U_H, U_L)$ if and only if $\lambda < F_L(\alpha)$.

**Proof:** See appendix 3.

The functions $F_H$ and $F_L$ which intersect for $\alpha = 0.343$ partition the $(\alpha, \lambda)$ space into the four regions shown in Figure 3.

---

\(^{11}\) Appendix 2 gives the details of the derivation of Table 1.

\(^{12}\) In this regard Choudhary et al.(2005) make a computational mistake in the calculation of $\Pi_H(U_H, D_L)$ which leads them to conclude that it is equal to $\Pi_H(D_H, D_L)$ [See their expressions (2) and (5)].
In region 1 where \( \alpha \) and \( \lambda \) are such that \( F_H(\alpha) < \lambda < F_L(\alpha) \), the \((D_H, D_L)\) regime Pareto-dominates the \((U_H, U_L)\) regime. In region 2 where \( \lambda > \max\{F_H(\alpha), F_L(\alpha)\} \) firm \( H \) is better off under the \((D_H, D_L)\) regime whereas firm \( L \) prefers the \((U_H, U_L)\) regime. The opposite is true in region 3 where \( \lambda < \min\{F_H(\alpha), F_L(\alpha)\} \). It is only in region 4 where \( F_L(\alpha) < \lambda < F_H(\alpha) \) that the regime \((D_H, D_L)\) is Pareto dominated by the regime \((U_H, U_L)\). Thus:

**Proposition 4** When consumer preferences are uniform over \([0, b]\) and unit cost is a convex function of quality, the discriminatory pricing regime is Pareto dominated by the uniform regime if and only if the following conditions hold: i/ \( \alpha \geq 0.343 \) and ii/ \( b \in \left[ F_L(\alpha)\left(\frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H + s_L} - \frac{s_H}{s_L}\right) + \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H + s_L}, F_H(\alpha)\left(\frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H + s_L} - \frac{s_H}{s_L}\right) + \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H + s_L}\right] \)

While discrimination allows the extraction of more surplus from a first group of buyers, uniform pricing offers the advantage of less intense competition for the patronage of a second group of buyers. In the first group one finds the consumers who have a strong preference for a particular quality when the two qualities are offered at unit cost. The second group is made up of consumers with a weak preference for a particular quality when the two qualities are offered at unit cost. A necessary condition for both firms to be better off under discriminatory pricing is that each gains from the capacity to extract surplus from the first group a benefit that exceeds the harm it suffers as result of more intense competition.

\(^{13}\)It is straightforward to show that for \( c(\alpha) = s^2 \) a prisoner’s dilemma occurs for \( b \in [2.45, 2.55] \) when \( s_H = 1, s_L = 0.5 \) and for \( b \in [1.63, 1.9] \) when \( s_H = 1, s_L = 0.25 \).
for the second group. Discrimination can yield a higher profit only if there is a sufficient disparity in qualities, or equivalently if the ratio $\alpha = s_L/s_H$ is sufficiently small. $(\alpha < 0.343)$. Indeed, when the latter condition is not met, there are no consumers with a strong preference for a particular quality. However, this condition is not sufficient. No firm prefers discrimination if the number of its "captive" buyers is not sufficiently large in relation to the number of its "non-captive" buyers. This explains why discrimination is Pareto-dominated only if the ratio of market areas - the ratio of "captive" to "non-captive" buyers - takes on intermediate values $(F_H(\alpha) < \lambda < F_L(\alpha))$. Conversely, discriminatory price schedules are dominant when both firms have captive consumers in numbers sufficiently large relative to "non-captive" buyers.

Because market shares and qualities are generally observable, one can determine if the conditions of the last proposition are satisfied, on the basis of information about the reservation price of consumers with the highest willingness to pay.

The proposition carries an implication for competition policy: When the conditions stated in the proposition are met, it is unlikely that a sudden switch by duopolists from discriminatory pricing to uniform pricing - perhaps via adoption of a most-favored customer clause - is brought about by independent action.

It is useful at this stage to set the results against Choudhary et al. (2005). These authors focus on the question how price and quality choices vary across pricing regimes. They do so numerically for a more restricted class of cost functions. The game, as Choudhary et al. describe it, unfolds as follows: At stage 1, firms simultaneously choose qualities, at stage 2 they select prices, and at stage 3 consumers decide which product, if any they purchase. Choudhary et al. (2005) start with the determination of equilibrium qualities for each of four exogenously given pricing regimes and then they compare profits across regimes taking into account of the fact that qualities as well as prices vary from one regime to the other. They fail to account for the fact that unless firms make a credible commitment to a particular pricing regime before setting qualities at stage 1, it is optimal for each of them to choose a discriminatory schedule at stage 2. This is true regardless of the qualities selected. For that reason, their equilibria do not conform to the description of their game and their comparison of profits does not shed light on the circumstances that give rise to a prisoner’s dilemma.

This paper by contrast focuses on the question whether firms have an incentive to agree to price uniformly for a given pair of qualities. This is certainly appropriate when qualities are given exogenously. It is also appropriate when all decisions in regard to pricing follow the selection of qualities and are not constrained by the quality choices. The latter assumption appears more reasonable from an empirical perspective.\footnote{We are hesitant to compare our results with Choudhary et al. (2005) because of a computational error in their paper. They find that the profit of the H-firm in the particular case where only the L-firm discriminates is equal to the profit of the H-firm when both firms discriminate. As Table 1 shows the profit of the H-firm under the $(U_H, D_L)$ regime is only half as large as under the $(D_H, D_L)$ regime when the distribution of consumer preferences is}
The following corollary compares the aggregate consumer surplus under regimes \((D_H, D_L)\) and \((U_H, U_L)\).

**Corollary:** When the conditions ensuring the existence of a prisoner’s dilemma are met, aggregate consumer surplus is higher when firms engage in personalized pricing than when they price uniformly.

**Proof:** The proof follows from the definition of aggregate welfare and from the result that aggregate welfare is maximized when the two firms choose profit-maximizing discriminatory price schedules.

6 Quality choice by discriminating duopolists.

Until now qualities were given. This section characterizes the equilibrium when qualities are endogenous. It does so for any density function \(f(\theta)\) and convex unit cost function \(c(s)\). Do examine quality choices one must add an initial stage to the game. At this initial stage both firms choose their qualities independently within a bounded interval \([0, S]\) where the upper value \(S\) is the highest quality allowed by technology. The subsequent stages are identical to the pricing game studied in the earlier sections. Because it has already been established that the subgame perfect equilibrium pricing strategy is discrimination by both firms regardless of quality, it is sufficient to consider this regime.

For all \(s_H > s_L > 0\), the Nash equilibrium in qualities satisfies the first order conditions (21) and (22) below, obtained from differentiation of (9) and (10) with respect to \(s_H\) and \(s_L\).\(^{15}\)

\[
\int_{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}^{b} \left[ \theta - c'(s_H) \right] f(\theta) d\theta = 0 \quad (21)
\]

\[
\int_{c(s_L) - c(s_H)}^{c(s_H) - c(s_L)} \left[ \theta - c'(s_L) \right] f(\theta) d\theta = 0 \quad (22)
\]

Conditions (21) and (22) simply state that the marginal cost of each quality equals the average marginal utility of buyers of that quality.\(^{16}\)

The following proposition characterizes the subgame-perfect equilibrium in qualities

**Proposition 5** For any density function of consumer preferences and convex unit cost of quality, the sub-game perfect equilibrium qualities are socially optimal.\(^{17}\)

\(^{15}\)Convexity of the unit cost function implies that the second order conditions are satisfied.

\(^{16}\)In order to conclude that conditions (21) and (22) define a Nash equilibrium in qualities, one must also establish that the firm producing the low quality has no incentive to deviate from \(s_L^*\) [given by (22)] and set quality higher than \(s_H^*\). But this raises the usual undeterminate question related to the identity of the firms, namely which one chooses the high quality given that the other one chooses the low quality.
Proof: Total welfare is

\[ W(s_H, s_L) =\int_{s_L}^{c(s_H) - c(s_L)} \left( \theta s_L - c(s_L) \right) f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{s_H}^{s_L} \left( \theta s_H - c(s_H) \right) f(\theta) d\theta \] (23)

Differentiation of (23) with respect to \( s_L \) yields

\[
\frac{\partial W(s_H, s_L)}{\partial s_L} = \int_{s_L}^{s_H} \left[ \theta - c'(s_L) \right] f(\theta) d\theta 
+ \left[ \frac{c(s_L) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} - c(s_L) \right] f \left( \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} \right) \frac{\partial [c(s_H) - c(s_L)]}{\partial s_L} 
- \left[ \frac{c(s_L) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} - c(s_L) \right] f \left( \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} \right) \frac{\partial [c(s_H) - c(s_L)]}{\partial s_L} 
- \left[ \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} - c(s_L) \right] f \left( \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} \right) \frac{\partial [c(s_H) - c(s_L)]}{\partial s_L} = 0 \] (24)

One easily checks that the sum of the second and fourth terms of (24) is zero. The reason is that a switch between high and low quality changes the utility of the consumer \( \theta = \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} \) by an amount equal to the difference in cost of the two qualities. Also, the third term of (24) is zero because for the consumer \( \theta = \frac{s_L}{s_H} \), a change in quality changes utility by an amount equal to the production cost. Thus, (24) simplifies to (22).

Similarly differentiation of (23) with respect to \( s_H \), yields

\[
\frac{\partial W(s_H, s_L)}{\partial s_H} = \int_{s_L}^{s_H} \left[ \theta - c'(s_H) \right] f(\theta) d\theta 
+ \left[ \frac{c(s_L) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} - c(s_L) \right] f \left( \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} \right) \frac{\partial [c(s_H) - c(s_L)]}{\partial s_H} 
- \left[ \frac{c(s_L) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} - c(s_L) \right] f \left( \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} \right) \frac{\partial [c(s_H) - c(s_L)]}{\partial s_H} 
- \left[ \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} - c(s_L) \right] f \left( \frac{c(s_H) - c(s_L)}{s_H - s_L} \right) \frac{\partial [c(s_H) - c(s_L)]}{\partial s_H} = 0 \] (25)

which simplifies to (21) because the first and third terms cancel out. QED

The reason why the firms choose welfare maximizing qualities is obvious. Discrimination allows then to capture all the extra utility generated by an extra unit of quality. This guarantees that the equilibrium qualities are welfare maximizing when the cost of quality is convex.

7 Final Remarks

Perfect price discrimination is a Nash equilibrium of the game where quality differentiated duopolists determine first whether to commit to a uniform price
and subsequently set prices and sell output. Whether specific consumers are better off under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the extent to which they are captive to a particular seller. Discrimination benefits consumers whose preference for one of the qualities is weak when both qualities are priced at unit cost. With respect to these consumers, the competition effect of discrimination outweighs the enhanced surplus extraction effect. Consumers who have a strong preference for a particular quality when both qualities are priced at unit cost, are worse off under discrimination.

In contrast to earlier contributions, this paper finds that under vertical differentiation both duopolists are not necessarily better off when they enforce an agreement to price uniformly. Necessary and sufficient conditions for both firms to earn higher profits under first-degree discrimination are a sufficiently large disparity in qualities, and a spread of consumer preferences for quality that is neither too large nor too small.

The paper also establishes that a unilateral move from uniform pricing to personalized pricing lowers the rival firm’s profits. For the specific case where consumer preferences are distributed uniformly, a unilateral deviation from discrimination towards uniform pricing halves the deviating firm’s profit.

Earlier research has shown that the grant of a most-favored customer clause by a single duopolist softens price competition and thereby increases the profits of all market participants. This paper clarifies why the assumption of uniform pricing is critical to that outcome. It shows that in the absence of a commitment to uniform pricing, a unilateral grant of price protection to one’s customers is always harmful to the party that makes the grant. It also provides an easily verifiable condition that antitrust authorities may use to formulate presumptions about the anticompetitive intent of most-favored-customer clauses.

The paper shows that for any exogenously given quality pair, competition in discriminatory prices schedules yields a welfare maximizing coverage of the market, and a welfare maximizing segmentation of the market into buyers of high and low quality. Furthermore, the qualities chosen by discriminating duopolists are welfare maximizing.

The analysis has disregarded the possibility that consumers manipulate the information that reaches sellers. Although some consumers act strategically, we believe that most do not, as only a minority is aware that information about their purchasing behavior is shared among sellers and might be used to facilitate price discrimination. It therefore remains useful to model discrimination in the absence of strategic consumer behavior.

A policy implication of the paper is that a minimum quality standard lowers aggregate welfare when firms engage in first-degree discrimination. This con-

\[17\] Much of the information is obtained by analyzing surfing patterns and purchasing history. This raises the question how the choice of pricing regimes is affected when buyers account for the effect of current purchases on future price offers. Some recent theoretical work (Acquisti and Varian (2003) and Villas-Boas (2003)) explores this question for the case of a monopolistic seller.

\[18\] Because the skills required to behave strategically are not widespread, one may assume that the percentage of buyers who behave strategically is even lower. [Turow et al. (2005)]
...trasts with earlier results showing that a mildly restrictive minimum quality requirement increases welfare [Ronen, 1991, Crampes and Hollander, 1995]. Under uniform pricing welfare increases because the quality requirement increases market coverage and intensifies price competition by narrowing the quality gap. An intensification of price competition also takes place when the firms discriminate. The reason, however, is different. Under discrimination a narrower quality gap expands the range of non-captive consumers. And, when pricing is discriminatory the minimum quality requirement restricts market coverage.

More importantly, the paper suggests that a reduction of the quality range - possibly in response to a minimum quality standard - encourages firms to choose distribution channels that ensure uniform pricing, or to opt for contractual arrangements that have the same effect. The latter brings about a further reduction in market coverage, and a suboptimal segmentation of consumers into high and low quality buyers.

The industrial organization literature has devoted much attention to the question how market structure affects price. This paper enlarges the perspective by pointing to a possible relationship between market structure and pricing regimes. Entry for example affects incentives to agree on uniform pricing when it reduces the disparity in qualities. Accounting for such possibility adds a new twist to the welfare effects of entry.

A standard reply to the question what differentiates an incumbent from an entrant is that the former can credibly commit to a course of action before the entrant appears on stage. The paper suggests that a greater capacity to engage in differential pricing may be an important distinguishing characteristic between an incumbent and an entrant. The pre-entry adoption of discriminatory pricing by an incumbent reveals information about buyers’ reservation prices that the entrant cannot possess. The entrant is more likely - at least initially - to set a uniform price, or divide consumers into fewer classes than the incumbent. The finding that a firm which prices uniformly earns less when its competitor discriminates than when it prices uniformly therefore implies than an incumbent who discriminates prior to entry is more likely to deter entry than an incumbent who does not. This suggests that a threat of entry may be a factor encouraging an incumbent to incur the sunk cost of acquiring information about consumer preferences.

The assumption that firms possess full information about individual reservation prices, and that information is acquired at no cost, obviously lacks realism (Varian, 2003). Consumer preferences are revealed largely through costly experimentation (Caminal and Matutes, 1990, Shafer and Zhang, 2000). Also, the cost of dividing consumers into different classes increases with the number of classes. For that reason the problem is not how to choose between perfect price discrimination and uniform pricing. It is to determine the optimal number of consumer classes. One may well find that the equilibrium number of consumer classes depends on the disparity of qualities. Exactly how will have to await

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19 See in this regard Aguirre et al., 1998. There is clearly no reason for the incumbent to move to uniform pricing post entry because discriminatory pricing gives the incumbent higher profits regardless of the price policy adopted by the entrant.
further research.

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Appendix 1: Non-existence of an equilibrium when simultaneously the $H$-firm chooses a uniform price and the $L$-firm chooses a personalized price scheme.

Proposition 6 The one-stage game where the high quality firm sets a uniform price and the low quality firm personalizes prices does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies.

Proof: We restrict the proof to the case of a uniform density where $f(\theta) = \frac{1}{b}$ for all $\theta \in [0,b]$. We already know that for a uniform price $p_H \geq c_H$, a best response of the low quality firm is given by:

$$p_L(\theta, p_H) = \begin{cases} 
\theta s_L & \text{for } \theta s_L \leq \frac{p_H}{s_H - s_L} \\
p_H - \theta(s_H - s_L) & \text{for } \frac{p_H}{s_H - s_L} < \theta \leq \frac{p_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} \\
c_L & \text{for } \frac{p_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} < \theta \leq b
\end{cases}$$

The profit of the high quality firm is therefore

$$\Pi_H(p_H, p_L(\cdot, p_H)) = \frac{1}{b}(p_H - c_H)(b - \frac{p_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L})$$

We show first that a pair $(p_H, p_L(\cdot, p_H))$ where $p_H > c_H$ cannot be an equilibrium. Take $p_H > c_H$ and consider a deviation by firm $H$ lowering its price to $\tilde{p}_H = p_H - \epsilon$ where $0 < \epsilon < p_H - c_H$. Consumers with $\theta \in [\frac{p_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L}, \frac{p_H - c_H}{s_H - s_L}]$ switch to the high quality because $\theta s_H - p_H + \epsilon > \theta s_L - p_H + \theta(s_H - s_L)$. Post deviation, the profit of the high quality firm is $\bar{\Pi}_H = \frac{1}{b}(\tilde{p}_H - c_H)(b - \frac{\tilde{p}_H}{s_H})$. Therefore, $\bar{\Pi}_H - \Pi_H = \frac{1}{b}[\epsilon(b - \frac{\tilde{p}_H}{s_H}) + (p_H - c_H)(\frac{p_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} - \frac{\tilde{p}_H}{s_H})]$. Because the second term on the right-hand-side can be made larger in absolute value than the first term, the deviation increases the profits of the high quality firm. This proves that there cannot be an equilibrium in pure strategies where $p_H > c_H$.

Consider now the case $p_H = c_H$ which entails $\Pi_H = 0$. The best response of firm $L$ is to sell to consumers $\theta \in \left[\frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L}, b\right]$ at unit cost $c_L$. If firm $H$ deviates by choosing $\bar{p}_H = c_H + \frac{1}{2}[b(s_H - s_L) - (c_H - c_L)] > c_H$, the consumer $\bar{\theta}$ who is indifferent between high quality sold at $\bar{p}_H$ and low quality sold at unit cost must be defined by $\bar{\theta} = \frac{p_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} = \frac{1}{2}[b + \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L}]$. Post deviation, the $H$ firm earns $\Pi_H = \frac{1}{b}(\bar{p}_H - c_H)(b - \bar{\theta}) > 0$. This completes the proof.

Appendix 2: Derivation of Table 1

7.0.1 Regime $(U_H, D_L)$

The best response of the $L$-firm to a commitment by the $H$-firm is given by (11) in the text. $\Pi_H(U_H, D_L) = \frac{1}{2}|p_H - c_H||b - \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L}|$ attains a maximum for $\bar{p}_H^{U_H, D_L} = \frac{1}{2}[c_H + c_L + b(s_H - s_L)]$ implying $\Pi_H(U_H, D_L) = \frac{1}{2b} [c_L - c_H + b(s_H - s_L)] \left[b - \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} + b\right)\right]$. 

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\[ \frac{s_L - s_H}{2D} \left[ \frac{c_H}{s_H - s_L} - \frac{c_L}{s_L} \right] \]

Note that \( b > \frac{s_H - s_L}{s_H - s_L} \) entails \( p_H^{UH,DL} > c_H \). Ans, substitution of \( p_H^{UH,DL} \) into (11) yields \( p_L^{UH,DL}(\theta) = \begin{cases} c_L & \text{for } \theta \geq \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} + b \right) \\ \frac{c_H + c_L + (b - 2\theta)(s_H - s_L)}{\theta s_L} & \text{for } \frac{1}{2} < \theta < \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} + b \right) \\ \frac{c_L}{s_L} & \text{for } \theta \leq \frac{1}{2} \end{cases} \]

The quantity sold by the L-firm is \( \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{s_H - s_L}{s_H - s_L} + b - \frac{c_L}{s_L} \right) \). The low quality buyer who pays the highest price has preference index \( \theta = \frac{1}{2} \frac{c_H + c_L + b(s_H - s_L)}{s_H - s_L} \) and pays the amount \( c_H + c_L + b(s_H - s_L) - \frac{c_L}{s_L} \). The profit earned from that consumer is

\[ \frac{s_L - c_L}{s_H - s_L} \left( \frac{c_H - c_L + 2\theta}{2\theta s_L} \right) = \frac{(s_H - s_L)}{2} \left( \frac{s_L}{s_H} \right) \frac{1}{2} \left( b + \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} \right) - \frac{c_L}{s_L} \]

Because the distribution of \( \theta \)'s is uniform, the average profit per unit sold by the L-firm is half that amount. Therefore \( \Pi_L = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{s_L}{s_H} \right) \left( \frac{1}{2} \left( b + \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} \right) - \frac{c_L}{s_L} \right) \).

### 7.0.2 Regime \((D_H, U_L)\)

When the L-firm commits to a uniform price \( p_L \in [c_L, c_H] \), the H-firm responds by choosing (16). The profit of the L-firm is \( \Pi_L(D_H, U_L) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ p_L - c_L \right] \left( \frac{c_H - p_L}{s_H - s_L} - \frac{c_L}{s_L} \right) \). It attains a maximum for \( p_L^{D_H, U_L} = \frac{1}{2} \left[ c_L + \frac{c_H}{s_H} \right] = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{c_H}{s_H} + \frac{c_L}{s_L} \right] \) implying

\[ p_L^{D_H, U_L} = \frac{s_L}{s_H} \left[ \frac{c_H}{s_H} - \frac{c_L}{s_L} \right] \]

Also, \( \frac{c_H - p_L}{s_H - s_L} = \frac{2c_H - c_L - \frac{c_H}{s_H}}{s_H - s_L} = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} + \frac{c_H}{s_H} \right) \), and

\[ p_L^{D_H, U_L} = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{c_H}{s_H} + \frac{c_L}{s_L} \right) \]

Because \( s_L < s_H \), is must be true that \( p_L^{D_H, U_L} \in [c_L, c_H] \). Therefore \( \Pi_L = \frac{1}{2} \frac{b}{2} \left( \frac{c_H}{s_H} - \frac{c_L}{s_L} \right) \left[ \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} + \frac{c_H}{s_H} \right] = \frac{s_L}{2D} \left[ \frac{c_H}{s_H} - \frac{c_L}{s_L} \right] \left[ \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} + \frac{c_H}{s_H} \right] \).

The market segment served by the H-firm is \( b - \frac{c_H - p_L}{s_H - s_L} = \frac{2c_H - c_L - \frac{c_H}{s_H}}{2(s_H - s_L)} = \frac{c_H - c_L + (1 - \frac{c_L}{s_H}) c_H}{2(s_H - s_L)} = b - \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} + \frac{c_H}{s_H} \right) \).

Substitution of \( p_L^{D_H, U_L} \) into (16) yields \( p_H^{D_H, U_L}(\theta) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} \left[ c_L + \frac{s_L}{s_H} c_H \right] + \theta(s_H - s_L) & \text{for } \theta \geq \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} + \frac{c_H}{s_H} \right) \\ \frac{c_H}{s_H} & \text{for } \theta < \frac{1}{2} \end{cases} \)

The average profit margin of the H-firm over the segment it serves is \( \frac{1}{2} \left( p_H^{D_H, U_L}(b) - c_H \right) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} \left( c_L + \frac{s_L}{s_H} c_H \right) + b(s_H - s_L) - c_H \right) = \frac{s_H - s_L}{2b} \left( b - \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} + \frac{c_H}{s_H} \right) \right) \).

Thus, the profit of the H-firm is \( \Pi_H(D_H, U_L) = \frac{s_H - s_L}{2b} \left( b - \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{c_H - c_L}{s_H - s_L} + \frac{c_H}{s_H} \right) \right)^2 \).

When \( p_L \geq c_H \), the H-firm sells to all consumers with \( \theta \in \left[ \frac{c_H}{s_H}, b \right] \) for a price \( p_H(\theta) = \theta s_H \). No consumer with \( \theta \in \left[ \frac{c_H}{s_H}, c_H \right] \) is willing to purchase low quality
product at the uniform price $p_L \geq c_H$. More pointedly, when $p_L \geq c_H$, the high-quality producer has a monopoly position and the low-quality producer has no market at all. Therefore, choosing $p_L \geq c_H$ is never rational on the part of a leader who produces the low quality.

7.0.3 Regime $(U_H, U_L)$

This is the standard case examined in the literature [Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), Moorthy (1988, 1991)]. Profit functions are $\Pi_H(p_H, p_L) = \frac{1}{b}(p_H-c_H)(b-H-p_L)$ and $\Pi_L(p_H, p_L) = \frac{1}{b}(p_L-c_L)(b-H-p_L-p_L)$. Simultaneous choice of prices by each firm yields $p_H^{U_H, U_L} = \frac{s_H-s_L}{4s_H-s_L}[b(s_H-s_L) + 2c_H + c_L]$ and $p_L^{U_H, U_L} = \frac{1}{4s_H-s_L}[2c_L s_H + c_H s_L]$.

Substitution into the profit function yields the profits that appear in Table 1.

Appendix 3: Proof of the lemma.

The inequality $\Pi_H(D_H, D_L) = \frac{s_H-s_L}{2b}[b-\frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L}]^2 > \Pi_H(U_H, U_L) = \frac{4s_H^2(s_H-s_L)}{(4s_H-s_L)^2}[b-\frac{1}{2}(\frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L})^2]$ is equivalent to $b - \frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L} > \frac{2\sqrt{2}s_H}{4s_H-s_L}[b - \frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L} + \frac{1}{2}\frac{s_H-s_L}{s_H} \frac{c_H-s_H}{s_L}]$ or $\left[b - \frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L}\right] \left[1 - \frac{2\sqrt{2}s_H}{4s_H-s_L} \frac{s_L}{s_H} \frac{c_H-s_H}{s_L} - \frac{c_L}{s_L}\right]$. Thus,

$$\Pi_H(D_H, D_L) > \Pi_H(U_H, U_L) \Leftrightarrow \lambda > F_H(\alpha) = \frac{\sqrt{2}\alpha}{4 - 2\sqrt{2} - \alpha} (21)$$

Because $\Pi_L(D_H, D_L) = \frac{s_L}{2b}[\frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L} - \frac{c_L}{s_L}] \frac{c_H-s_H}{s_L} = \frac{s_L(s_H-s_L)}{2bs_H} \frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L} \frac{c_H-s_H}{s_L} \frac{c_L}{s_L}$ and $\Pi_L(U_H, U_L) = \frac{4s_L(s_H-s_L)}{(4s_H-s_L)^2}[b - \frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L} - \frac{c_L}{s_L}]^2$ we have $\Pi_L(D_H, D_L) > \Pi_L(U_H, U_L)$ if and only if $\frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L} - \frac{c_L}{s_L} < \frac{2\sqrt{2}s_H}{4s_H-s_L}[b - \frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L} + \frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L}]$ or $\frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L} - \frac{c_L}{s_L} \left(1 - \frac{2\sqrt{2}s_H}{4s_H-s_L}\right) < \frac{2\sqrt{2}s_H}{4s_H-s_L}(b - \frac{c_H-c_L}{s_H-s_L})$.

Thus

$$\Pi_L(D_H, D_L) > \Pi_L(U_H, U_L) \Leftrightarrow \lambda < F_L(\alpha) = \frac{4 - 2\sqrt{2} - \alpha}{\sqrt{2}} (22)$$